/*
 * SSL3 Protocol
 *
 * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
 * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
 * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */

/* TLS extension code moved here from ssl3ecc.c */

#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
#include "blapit.h"
#else
#include "blapi.h"
#endif
#include "prinit.h"

static unsigned char  key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN];
static PK11SymKey    *session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
static PK11SymKey    *session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL;

#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
static unsigned char  session_ticket_enc_key[AES_256_KEY_LENGTH];
static unsigned char  session_ticket_mac_key[SHA256_LENGTH];

static PRBool         session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_FALSE;
#endif
static PRCallOnceType generate_session_keys_once;

/* forward static function declarations */
static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss,
    SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket);
static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf,
    PRUint32 bytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num,
    PRInt32 lenSize);
static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss,
    PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key);
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key,
    PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key,
    PRUint32 *mac_key_length);
#endif
static PRInt32 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket * ss,
    PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
    PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
                        PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
                        PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss,
                        PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                              SECItem *data);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
                                               PRUint32 maxBytes);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
                                          PRUint32 maxBytes);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
                                          PRUint32 maxBytes);
static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
    PRUint32 maxBytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
    SECItem *data);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss,
    PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss,
    PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data);
static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss,
                                                   PRUint16 ex_type,
                                                   SECItem *data);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
                                               PRUint32 maxBytes);
static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
                                         PRUint32 maxBytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                             SECItem *data);

static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendDraftVersionXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append,
                                              PRUint32 maxBytes);
static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleDraftVersionXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                                  SECItem *data);

/*
 * Write bytes.  Using this function means the SECItem structure
 * cannot be freed.  The caller is expected to call this function
 * on a shallow copy of the structure.
 */
static SECStatus
ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes)
{
    if (bytes > item->len)
        return SECFailure;

    PORT_Memcpy(item->data, buf, bytes);
    item->data += bytes;
    item->len -= bytes;
    return SECSuccess;
}

/*
 * Write a number in network byte order. Using this function means the
 * SECItem structure cannot be freed.  The caller is expected to call
 * this function on a shallow copy of the structure.
 */
static SECStatus
ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    PRUint8   b[4];
    PRUint8 * p = b;

    switch (lenSize) {
    case 4:
        *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 24);
    case 3:
        *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 16);
    case 2:
        *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 8);
    case 1:
        *p = (PRUint8) num;
    }
    rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(item, &b[0], lenSize);
    return rv;
}

static SECStatus ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(void* appData, void* nssData)
{
    if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11) {
        PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11);
        session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
    }
    if (session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11) {
        PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11);
        session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL;
    }
    PORT_Memset(&generate_session_keys_once, 0,
        sizeof(generate_session_keys_once));
    return SECSuccess;
}


static PRStatus
ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(void *data)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    sslSocket *ss = (sslSocket *)data;
    SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY;
    SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKeyPair->pubKey;

    if (svrPrivKey == NULL || svrPubKey == NULL) {
        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Pub or priv key(s) is NULL.",
                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
        goto loser;
    }

    /* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */
    PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX,
        sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX));
    if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(svrPrivKey, svrPubKey,
            ss->pkcs11PinArg, &key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN],
            &session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11, &session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11))
        return PR_FAILURE;

    rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown, NULL);
    if (rv != SECSuccess)
        goto loser;

    return PR_SUCCESS;

loser:
    ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(NULL, NULL);
    return PR_FAILURE;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key,
                                PK11SymKey **mac_key)
{
    if (PR_CallOnceWithArg(&generate_session_keys_once,
            ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11, ss) != PR_SUCCESS)
        return SECFailure;

    if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 == NULL ||
        session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 == NULL)
        return SECFailure;

    *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11;
    *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11;
    return SECSuccess;
}

#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
static PRStatus
ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys(void)
{
    PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX,
        sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX));

    if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeys(&key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN],
            session_ticket_enc_key, session_ticket_mac_key))
        return PR_FAILURE;

    session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_TRUE;
    return PR_SUCCESS;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key,
    PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key,
    PRUint32 *mac_key_length)
{
    if (PR_CallOnce(&generate_session_keys_once,
            ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys) != PR_SUCCESS)
        return SECFailure;

    if (!session_ticket_keys_initialized)
        return SECFailure;

    *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key;
    *aes_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key);
    *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key;
    *mac_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key);

    return SECSuccess;
}
#endif

/* Table of handlers for received TLS hello extensions, one per extension.
 * In the second generation, this table will be dynamic, and functions
 * will be registered here.
 */
/* This table is used by the server, to handle client hello extensions. */
static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = {
    { ssl_server_name_xtn,        &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn },
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
    { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn,    &ssl3_HandleSupportedCurvesXtn },
    { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn,   &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
#endif
    { ssl_session_ticket_xtn,     &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn },
    { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,    &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
    { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn },
    { ssl_use_srtp_xtn,           &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn },
    { ssl_cert_status_xtn,        &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn },
    { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn },
    { ssl_tls13_draft_version_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleDraftVersionXtn },
    { -1, NULL }
};

/* These two tables are used by the client, to handle server hello
 * extensions. */
static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = {
    { ssl_server_name_xtn,        &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn },
    /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */
    { ssl_session_ticket_xtn,     &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn },
    { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,    &ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn },
    { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn },
    { ssl_use_srtp_xtn,           &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn },
    { ssl_cert_status_xtn,        &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn },
    { -1, NULL }
};

static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersSSL3[] = {
    { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn },
    { -1, NULL }
};

/* Tables of functions to format TLS hello extensions, one function per
 * extension.
 * These static tables are for the formatting of client hello extensions.
 * The server's table of hello senders is dynamic, in the socket struct,
 * and sender functions are registered there.
 */
static const
ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersTLS[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = {
    { ssl_server_name_xtn,        &ssl3_SendServerNameXtn        },
    { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn },
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
    { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn,    &ssl3_SendSupportedCurvesXtn },
    { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn,   &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn },
#endif
    { ssl_session_ticket_xtn,     &ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn },
    { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn,    &ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn },
    { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn },
    { ssl_use_srtp_xtn,           &ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn },
    { ssl_cert_status_xtn,        &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn },
    { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn },
    { ssl_tls13_draft_version_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendDraftVersionXtn },
    /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL }    */
};

static const
ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersSSL3[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = {
    { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }
    /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL }    */
};

static PRBool
arrayContainsExtension(const PRUint16 *array, PRUint32 len, PRUint16 ex_type)
{
    int i;
    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
        if (ex_type == array[i])
            return PR_TRUE;
    }
    return PR_FALSE;
}

PRBool
ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) {
    TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
    return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->negotiated,
                                  xtnData->numNegotiated, ex_type);
}

static PRBool
ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) {
    TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
    return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->advertised,
                                  xtnData->numAdvertised, ex_type);
}

/* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL,
 * unless that name is a dotted decimal string.
 * Used by client and server.
 */
PRInt32
ssl3_SendServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
                       PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    if (!ss)
        return 0;
    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
        PRUint32 len;
        PRNetAddr netAddr;

        /* must have a hostname */
        if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0])
            return 0;
        /* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */
        if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) {
            /* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */
            return 0;
        }
        len  = PORT_Strlen(ss->url);
        if (append && maxBytes >= len + 9) {
            /* extension_type */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* length of extension_data */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 5, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* length of server_name_list */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 3, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss,       "\0",    1);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* HostName (length and value) */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, (PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
                TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
                xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
                    ssl_server_name_xtn;
            }
        }
        return len + 9;
    }
    /* Server side */
    if (append && maxBytes >= 4) {
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)  return -1;
        /* length of extension_data */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
    }
    return 4;
}

/* handle an incoming SNI extension, by ignoring it. */
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    SECItem *names = NULL;
    PRUint32 listCount = 0, namesPos = 0, i;
    TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
    SECItem  ldata;
    PRInt32  listLenBytes = 0;

    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
        /* Verify extension_data is empty. */
        if (data->data || data->len ||
            !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) {
            /* malformed or was not initiated by the client.*/
            return SECFailure;
        }
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    /* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */
    /* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */
    if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }
    /* length of server_name_list */
    listLenBytes = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
    if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    ldata = *data;
    /* Calculate the size of the array.*/
    while (listLenBytes > 0) {
        SECItem litem;
        SECStatus rv;
        PRInt32  type;
        /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
        type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &ldata.data, &ldata.len);
        if (!ldata.len) {
            return SECFailure;
        }
        rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 2, &ldata.data, &ldata.len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return SECFailure;
        }
        /* Adjust total length for cunsumed item, item len and type.*/
        listLenBytes -= litem.len + 3;
        if (listLenBytes > 0 && !ldata.len) {
            return SECFailure;
        }
        listCount += 1;
    }
    if (!listCount) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, listCount);
    if (!names) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    for (i = 0;i < listCount;i++) {
        int j;
        PRInt32  type;
        SECStatus rv;
        PRBool nametypePresent = PR_FALSE;
        /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
        type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
        /* Check if we have such type in the list */
        for (j = 0;j < listCount && names[j].data;j++) {
            if (names[j].type == type) {
                nametypePresent = PR_TRUE;
                break;
            }
        }
        /* HostName (length and value) */
        rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &names[namesPos], 2,
                                           &data->data, &data->len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            goto loser;
        }
        if (nametypePresent == PR_FALSE) {
            namesPos += 1;
        }
    }
    /* Free old and set the new data. */
    if (xtnData->sniNameArr) {
        PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr);
    }
    xtnData->sniNameArr = names;
    xtnData->sniNameArrSize = namesPos;
    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn;

    return SECSuccess;

loser:
    PORT_Free(names);
    return SECFailure;
}

/* Called by both clients and servers.
 * Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise
 * sends an empty ticket.  Servers always send empty tickets.
 */
PRInt32
ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn(
                        sslSocket * ss,
                        PRBool      append,
                        PRUint32    maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;
    NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL;
    sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid;

    /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
    if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets)
        return 0;

    /* Empty extension length = extension_type (2-bytes) +
     * length(extension_data) (2-bytes)
     */
    extension_length = 4;

    /* If we are a client then send a session ticket if one is availble.
     * Servers that support the extension and are willing to negotiate the
     * the extension always respond with an empty extension.
     */
    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
        /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot
         * just acquire and release the lock within this function because the
         * caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be
         * consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller
         * will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're
         * attempting to resume an existing session.
         */

        session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
        if (session_ticket->ticket.data) {
            if (ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) {
                extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
            } else if (!append &&
                (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 ||
                (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint +
                    session_ticket->received_timestamp > ssl_Time()))) {
                extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len;
                ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_TRUE;
            }
        }
    }

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        SECStatus rv;
        /* extension_type */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        if (session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data &&
            ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) {
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, session_ticket->ticket.data,
                session_ticket->ticket.len, 2);
            ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
            ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
        } else {
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
        }
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;

        if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
            TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
            xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_session_ticket_xtn;
        }
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        PORT_Assert(0);
        return 0;
    }
    return extension_length;

 loser:
    ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
    return -1;
}

/* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                  SECItem *data)
{
    if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) {
        /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    /* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling
     * ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the
     * extension back to the client. */

    return SECSuccess;
}

/* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none
 * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of
 * the block. */
SECStatus
ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char* data, unsigned int length)
{
    unsigned int offset = 0;

    while (offset < length) {
        unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int) data[offset];
        /* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that
         * store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings.
         */
        if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) {
            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
            return SECFailure;
        }
        offset = newOffset;
    }

    if (offset > length) {
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    return SECSuccess;
}

/* protocol selection handler for ALPN (server side) and NPN (client side) */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    unsigned char resultBuffer[255];
    SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 };

    rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len);
    if (rv != SECSuccess)
        return rv;

    PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback);
    rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len,
                               result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer);
    if (rv != SECSuccess)
        return rv;
    /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our
     * stack. */
    if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    if (ex_type == ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn &&
        ss->ssl3.nextProtoState != SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
        /* The callback might say OK, but then it's picked a default.
         * That's OK for NPN, but not ALPN. */
        SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_PROTOCOL);
        (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, no_application_protocol);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
    return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result);
}

/* handle an incoming ALPN extension at the server */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    int count;
    SECStatus rv;

    /* We expressly don't want to allow ALPN on renegotiation,
     * despite it being permitted by the spec. */
    if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len == 0) {
        /* Clients MUST send a non-empty ALPN extension. */
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    /* unlike NPN, ALPN has extra redundant length information so that
     * the extension is the same in both ClientHello and ServerHello */
    count = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
    if (count < 0) {
        return SECFailure; /* fatal alert was sent */
    }
    if (count != data->len) {
        return ssl3_DecodeError(ss);
    }

    if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
        /* we're not configured for it */
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    rv = ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, ex_type, data);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
      return rv;
    }

    /* prepare to send back a response, if we negotiated */
    if (ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED) {
        return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(
            ss, ex_type, ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn);
    }
    return SECSuccess;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                  SECItem *data)
{
    PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);

    if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) {
        /* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what
         * protocol to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate
         * a different one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if
         * we've negotiated NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake
         * message. Thus, these two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the
         * same connection. */
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    /* We should only get this call if we sent the extension, so
     * ss->nextProtoCallback needs to be non-NULL.  However, it is possible
     * that an application erroneously cleared the callback between the time
     * we sent the ClientHello and now. */
    if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) {
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_NO_CALLBACK);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    return ssl3_SelectAppProtocol(ss, ex_type, data);
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    const unsigned char* d = data->data;
    PRUint16 name_list_len;
    SECItem protocol_name;

    if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) {
        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    /* The extension data from the server has the following format:
     *   uint16 name_list_len;
     *   uint8 len;
     *   uint8 protocol_name[len]; */
    if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) {
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    name_list_len = ((PRUint16) d[0]) << 8 |
                    ((PRUint16) d[1]);
    if (name_list_len != data->len - 2 || d[2] != data->len - 3) {
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    protocol_name.data = data->data + 3;
    protocol_name.len = data->len - 3;

    SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE);
    ss->ssl3.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED;
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
    return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &protocol_name);
}

static PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
                                PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;

    /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
    if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) {
        return 0;
    }

    extension_length = 4;

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        SECStatus rv;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn;
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        return 0;
    }

    return extension_length;

loser:
    return -1;
}

static PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;
    unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;

    /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */
    if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) {
        return 0;
    }

    extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ +
                       2 /* protocol name list length */ +
                       ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        /* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the
         * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So we
         * allocate a buffer and move the first protocol to the end of the
         * list. */
        SECStatus rv;
        const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len;

        alpn_protos = PORT_Alloc(len);
        if (alpn_protos == NULL) {
            return SECFailure;
        }
        if (len > 0) {
            /* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */
            unsigned int i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1;
            if (i <= len) {
                memcpy(alpn_protos, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i);
                memcpy(alpn_protos + len - i, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i);
            } else {
                /* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */
                memcpy(alpn_protos, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len);
            }
        }

        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            goto loser;
        }
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            goto loser;
        }
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, alpn_protos, len, 2);
        PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
        alpn_protos = NULL;
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            goto loser;
        }
        ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn;
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        return 0;
    }

    return extension_length;

loser:
    if (alpn_protos) {
        PORT_Free(alpn_protos);
    }
    return -1;
}

static PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;

    /* we're in over our heads if any of these fail */
    PORT_Assert(ss->opt.enableALPN);
    PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProto.data);
    PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProto.len > 0);
    PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.nextProtoState == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED);
    PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone);

    extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ +
                       2 /* protocol name list */ + 1 /* name length */ +
                       ss->ssl3.nextProto.len;

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        SECStatus rv;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return -1;
        }
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return -1;
        }
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.len + 1, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return -1;
        }
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.nextProto.data,
                                          ss->ssl3.nextProto.len, 1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return -1;
        }
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        return 0;
    }

    return extension_length;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                 SECItem *data)
{
    /* The echoed extension must be empty. */
    if (data->len != 0)
       return SECFailure;

    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    return SECSuccess;
}

static PRInt32
ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(
                        sslSocket * ss,
                        PRBool      append,
                        PRUint32    maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;
    SECStatus rv;
    int i;
    PRBool haveStatus = PR_FALSE;

    for (i = kt_null; i < kt_kea_size; i++) {
        /* TODO: This is a temporary workaround.
         *       The correct code needs to see if we have an OCSP response for
         *       the server certificate being used, rather than if we have any
         *       OCSP response. See also ssl3_SendCertificateStatus.
         */
        if (ss->certStatusArray[i] && ss->certStatusArray[i]->len) {
            haveStatus = PR_TRUE;
            break;
        }
    }
    if (!haveStatus)
        return 0;

    extension_length = 2 + 2;
    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        /* extension_type */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            return -1;
        /* length of extension_data */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            return -1;
    }

    return extension_length;
}

/* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the
 * client side. See RFC 4366 section 3.6. */
static PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append,
                               PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;

    if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling)
       return 0;

    /* extension_type (2-bytes) +
     * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) +
     * status_type (1) +
     * responder_id_list length (2) +
     * request_extensions length (2)
     */
    extension_length = 9;

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
       SECStatus rv;
       TLSExtensionData *xtnData;

       /* extension_type */
       rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2);
       if (rv != SECSuccess)
           return -1;
       rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
       if (rv != SECSuccess)
           return -1;
       rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1);
       if (rv != SECSuccess)
           return -1;
       /* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are
        * implicitly known to the server. */
       rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
       if (rv != SECSuccess)
           return -1;
       /* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions.
        * Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This
        * means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */
       rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2);
       if (rv != SECSuccess)
           return -1;

       xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
       xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn;
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
       PORT_Assert(0);
       return 0;
    }
    return extension_length;
}

/*
 * NewSessionTicket
 * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished
 */
SECStatus
ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss)
{
    int                  i;
    SECStatus            rv;
    NewSessionTicket     ticket;
    SECItem              plaintext;
    SECItem              plaintext_item = {0, NULL, 0};
    SECItem              ciphertext     = {0, NULL, 0};
    PRUint32             ciphertext_length;
    PRBool               ms_is_wrapped;
    unsigned char        wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH];
    SECItem              ms_item = {0, NULL, 0};
    SSL3KEAType          effectiveExchKeyType = ssl_kea_null;
    PRUint32             padding_length;
    PRUint32             message_length;
    PRUint32             cert_length;
    PRUint8              length_buf[4];
    PRUint32             now;
    PK11SymKey          *aes_key_pkcs11;
    PK11SymKey          *mac_key_pkcs11;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
    const unsigned char *aes_key;
    const unsigned char *mac_key;
    PRUint32             aes_key_length;
    PRUint32             mac_key_length;
    PRUint64             aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
    AESContext          *aes_ctx;
    const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL;
    PRUint64             hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
    HMACContext         *hmac_ctx;
#endif
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
    PK11Context         *aes_ctx_pkcs11;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
    PK11Context         *hmac_ctx_pkcs11;
    unsigned char        computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
    unsigned int         computed_mac_length;
    unsigned char        iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
    SECItem              ivItem;
    SECItem             *srvName = NULL;
    PRUint32             srvNameLen = 0;
    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value,
                                          * must be >= 0 */

    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake",
                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));

    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss));
    PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss));

    ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT;
    cert_length = (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) ?
        3 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len : 0;

    /* Get IV and encryption keys */
    ivItem.data = iv;
    ivItem.len = sizeof(iv);
    rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
    if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
        rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length,
            &mac_key, &mac_key_length);
    } else
#endif
    {
        rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11,
            &mac_key_pkcs11);
    }
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data) {
        /* The master secret is available unwrapped. */
        ms_item.data = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data;
        ms_item.len = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len;
        ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE;
    } else {
        /* Extract the master secret wrapped. */
        sslSessionID sid;
        PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID));

        if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) {
            effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa;
        } else {
            effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType;
        }

        rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, &sid, ss->ssl3.pwSpec,
            effectiveExchKeyType);
        if (rv == SECSuccess) {
            if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms))
                goto loser;
            memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
                sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len);
            ms_item.data = wrapped_ms;
            ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len;
            msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech;
        } else {
            /* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */
            goto loser;
        }
        ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE;
    }
    /* Prep to send negotiated name */
    srvName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName;
    if (srvName->data && srvName->len) {
        srvNameLen = 2 + srvName->len; /* len bytes + name len */
    }

    ciphertext_length =
        sizeof(PRUint16)                     /* ticket_version */
        + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion)        /* ssl_version */
        + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)            /* ciphersuite */
        + 1                                  /* compression */
        + 10                                 /* cipher spec parameters */
        + 1                                  /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */
        + 1                                  /* effectiveExchKeyType */
        + 4                                  /* msWrapMech */
        + 2                                  /* master_secret.length */
        + ms_item.len                        /* master_secret */
        + 1                                  /* client_auth_type */
        + cert_length                        /* cert */
        + 1                                  /* server name type */
        + srvNameLen                         /* name len + length field */
        + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint);
    padding_length =  AES_BLOCK_SIZE -
        (ciphertext_length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
    ciphertext_length += padding_length;

    message_length =
        sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint)    /* ticket_lifetime_hint */
        + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket */
        + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN             /* key_name */
        + AES_BLOCK_SIZE                       /* iv */
        + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket.encrypted_state */
        + ciphertext_length                    /* encrypted_state */
        + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH;       /* mac */

    if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, ciphertext_length) == NULL)
        goto loser;

    plaintext = plaintext_item;

    /* ticket_version */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION,
        sizeof(PRUint16));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* ssl_version */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version,
        sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* ciphersuite */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite,
        sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* compression */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* cipher spec parameters */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authAlgorithm, 1);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* master_secret */
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, effectiveExchKeyType, 1);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    /* client_identity */
    if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) {
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext,
            ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext,
            ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data,
            ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    } else {
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    }

    /* timestamp */
    now = ssl_Time();
    rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now,
        sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    if (srvNameLen) {
        /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->type, 1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
        /* HostName (length and value) */
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    } else {
        /* No Name */
        rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, (char)TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME,
                                     1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    }

    PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == padding_length);
    for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++)
        plaintext.data[i] = (unsigned char)padding_length;

    if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ciphertext, ciphertext_length) == NULL) {
        rv = SECFailure;
        goto loser;
    }

    /* Generate encrypted portion of ticket. */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
    if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
        aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf;
        rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, aes_key_length, iv,
            NSS_AES_CBC, 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

        rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_ctx, ciphertext.data, &ciphertext.len,
            ciphertext.len, plaintext_item.data,
            plaintext_item.len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    } else
#endif
    {
        aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech,
            CKA_ENCRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem);
        if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11)
            goto loser;

        rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data,
            (int *)&ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len,
            plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len);
        PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11);
        PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    }

    /* Convert ciphertext length to network order. */
    length_buf[0] = (ciphertext.len >> 8) & 0xff;
    length_buf[1] = (ciphertext.len     ) & 0xff;

    /* Compute MAC. */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
    if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
        hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf;
        hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
        if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key,
                mac_key_length, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;

        HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx);
        HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
        HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));
        HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2);
        HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
        HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length,
            sizeof(computed_mac));
    } else
#endif
    {
        SECItem macParam;
        macParam.data = NULL;
        macParam.len = 0;
        hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech,
            CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam);
        if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11)
            goto loser;

        rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11);
        rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, key_name,
            SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
        rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, iv, sizeof(iv));
        rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2);
        rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len);
        rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac,
            &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
        PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;
    }

    /* Serialize the handshake message. */
    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, message_length);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint,
        sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
        message_length - sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) - 2, 2);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, iv, sizeof(iv));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len, 2);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

    rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, computed_mac, computed_mac_length);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser;

loser:
    if (plaintext_item.data)
        SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE);
    if (ciphertext.data)
        SECITEM_FreeItem(&ciphertext, PR_FALSE);

    return rv;
}

/* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket
 * message is expected during the handshake.
 */
SECStatus
ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                  SECItem *data)
{
    if (data->len != 0)
        return SECFailure;

    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
    return SECSuccess;
}

SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                  SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    SECItem *decrypted_state = NULL;
    SessionTicket *parsed_session_ticket = NULL;
    sslSessionID *sid = NULL;
    SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats;

    /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */
    if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets)
        return SECSuccess;

    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    /* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client.  We are
     * lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake
     * instead of terminating the current connection.
     */
    if (data->len == 0) {
        ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE;
    } else {
        int                    i;
        SECItem                extension_data;
        EncryptedSessionTicket enc_session_ticket;
        unsigned char          computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH];
        unsigned int           computed_mac_length;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
        const SECHashObject   *hashObj;
        const unsigned char   *aes_key;
        const unsigned char   *mac_key;
        PRUint32               aes_key_length;
        PRUint32               mac_key_length;
        PRUint64               hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
        HMACContext           *hmac_ctx;
        PRUint64               aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS];
        AESContext            *aes_ctx;
#endif
        PK11SymKey            *aes_key_pkcs11;
        PK11SymKey            *mac_key_pkcs11;
        PK11Context           *hmac_ctx_pkcs11;
        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE      macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC;
        PK11Context           *aes_ctx_pkcs11;
        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE      cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC;
        unsigned char *        padding;
        PRUint32               padding_length;
        unsigned char         *buffer;
        unsigned int           buffer_len;
        PRInt32                temp;
        SECItem                cert_item;
        PRInt8                 nameType = TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME;

        /* Turn off stateless session resumption if the client sends a
         * SessionTicket extension, even if the extension turns out to be
         * malformed (ss->sec.ci.sid is non-NULL when doing session
         * renegotiation.)
         */
        if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) {
            if (ss->sec.uncache)
                ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid);
            ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid);
            ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL;
        }

        extension_data.data = data->data; /* Keep a copy for future use. */
        extension_data.len = data->len;

        if (ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(ss, data, &enc_session_ticket)
            != SECSuccess)
            return SECFailure;

        /* Get session ticket keys. */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
        if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
            rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length,
                &mac_key, &mac_key_length);
        } else
#endif
        {
            rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11,
                &mac_key_pkcs11);
        }
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate session ticket keys.",
                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
            goto loser;
        }

        /* If the ticket sent by the client was generated under a key different
         * from the one we have, bypass ticket processing.
         */
        if (PORT_Memcmp(enc_session_ticket.key_name, key_name,
                SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket key_name sent mismatch.",
                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
            goto no_ticket;
        }

        /* Verify the MAC on the ticket.  MAC verification may also
         * fail if the MAC key has been recently refreshed.
         */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
        if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
            hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf;
            hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
            if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key,
                    sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key), PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess)
                goto no_ticket;
            HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx);
            HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, extension_data.data,
                extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH);
            if (HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length,
                    sizeof(computed_mac)) != SECSuccess)
                goto no_ticket;
        } else
#endif
        {
            SECItem macParam;
            macParam.data = NULL;
            macParam.len = 0;
            hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech,
                CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam);
            if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) {
                SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create HMAC context: %d.",
                            SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError()));
                goto no_ticket;
            } else {
                SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Successfully created HMAC context.",
                            SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
            }
            rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11);
            rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, extension_data.data,
                extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
                goto no_ticket;
            }
            rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac,
                &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac));
            PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
            if (rv != SECSuccess)
                goto no_ticket;
        }
        if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed_mac, enc_session_ticket.mac,
                computed_mac_length) != 0) {
            SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket MAC mismatch.",
                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
            goto no_ticket;
        }

        /* We ignore key_name for now.
         * This is ok as MAC verification succeeded.
         */

        /* Decrypt the ticket. */

        /* Plaintext is shorter than the ciphertext due to padding. */
        decrypted_state = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL,
            enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);

#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
        if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
            aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf;
            rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key,
                sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key), enc_session_ticket.iv,
                NSS_AES_CBC, 0,AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
                SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.",
                            SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
                goto no_ticket;
            }

            rv = AES_Decrypt(aes_ctx, decrypted_state->data,
                &decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len,
                enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data,
                enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
            if (rv != SECSuccess)
                goto no_ticket;
        } else
#endif
        {
            SECItem ivItem;
            ivItem.data = enc_session_ticket.iv;
            ivItem.len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
            aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech,
                CKA_DECRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem);
            if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) {
                SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.",
                            SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
                goto no_ticket;
            }

            rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, decrypted_state->data,
                (int *)&decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len,
                enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data,
                enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len);
            PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11);
            PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE);
            if (rv != SECSuccess)
                goto no_ticket;
        }

        /* Check padding. */
        padding_length =
            (PRUint32)decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - 1];
        if (padding_length == 0 || padding_length > AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
            goto no_ticket;

        padding = &decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - padding_length];
        for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++, padding++) {
            if (padding_length != (PRUint32)*padding)
                goto no_ticket;
        }

        /* Deserialize session state. */
        buffer = decrypted_state->data;
        buffer_len = decrypted_state->len;

        parsed_session_ticket = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SessionTicket));
        if (parsed_session_ticket == NULL) {
            rv = SECFailure;
            goto loser;
        }

        /* Read ticket_version (which is ignored for now.) */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->ticket_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;

        /* Read SSLVersion. */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp;

        /* Read cipher_suite. */
        temp =  ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;

        /* Read compression_method. */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->compression_method = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp;

        /* Read cipher spec parameters. */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm = (SSLSignType)temp;
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp;
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp;
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp;

        /* Read wrapped master_secret. */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped = (PRBool)temp;

        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType = (SSL3KEAType)temp;

        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp;

        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp;
        if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length == 0 ||  /* sanity check MS. */
            parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
            sizeof(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret))
            goto no_ticket;

        /* Allow for the wrapped master secret to be longer. */
        if (buffer_len < parsed_session_ticket->ms_length)
            goto no_ticket;
        PORT_Memcpy(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, buffer,
            parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
        buffer += parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
        buffer_len -= parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;

        /* Read client_identity */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0)
            goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type =
            (ClientAuthenticationType)temp;
        switch(parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type) {
            case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS:
                break;
            case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE:
                rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_item, 3,
                    &buffer, &buffer_len);
                if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
                rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert,
                    &cert_item);
                if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
                break;
            default:
                goto no_ticket;
        }
        /* Read timestamp. */
        temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (temp < 0)
            goto no_ticket;
        parsed_session_ticket->timestamp = (PRUint32)temp;

        /* Read server name */
        nameType =
                ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len);
        if (nameType != TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME) {
            SECItem name_item;
            rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &name_item, 2, &buffer,
                                               &buffer_len);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
            rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->srvName,
                                  &name_item);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket;
            parsed_session_ticket->srvName.type = nameType;
        }

        /* Done parsing.  Check that all bytes have been consumed. */
        if (buffer_len != padding_length)
            goto no_ticket;

        /* Use the ticket if it has not expired, otherwise free the allocated
         * memory since the ticket is of no use.
         */
        if (parsed_session_ticket->timestamp != 0 &&
            parsed_session_ticket->timestamp +
            TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT > ssl_Time()) {

            sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE);
            if (sid == NULL) {
                rv = SECFailure;
                goto loser;
            }

            /* Copy over parameters. */
            sid->version = parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version;
            sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite;
            sid->u.ssl3.compression = parsed_session_ticket->compression_method;
            sid->authAlgorithm = parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm;
            sid->authKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits;
            sid->keaType = parsed_session_ticket->keaType;
            sid->keaKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits;

            /* Copy master secret. */
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
            if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 &&
                    parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped)
                goto no_ticket;
#endif
            if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length >
                    sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret))
                goto no_ticket;
            PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret,
                parsed_session_ticket->master_secret,
                parsed_session_ticket->ms_length);
            sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len =
                parsed_session_ticket->ms_length;
            sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType;
            sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech;
            sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped =
                parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped;
            sid->u.ssl3.masterValid    = PR_TRUE;
            sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE;

            /* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */
            if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data != NULL) {
                if (sid->peerCert != NULL)
                    CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert);
                sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle,
                    &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE);
                if (sid->peerCert == NULL) {
                    rv = SECFailure;
                    goto loser;
                }
            }
            if (parsed_session_ticket->srvName.data != NULL) {
                sid->u.ssl3.srvName = parsed_session_ticket->srvName;
            }
            ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE;
            ss->sec.ci.sid = sid;
        }
    }

    if (0) {
no_ticket:
        SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.",
                        SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
        ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics();
        SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures );
    }
    rv = SECSuccess;

loser:
        /* ss->sec.ci.sid == sid if it did NOT come here via goto statement
         * in that case do not free sid
         */
        if (sid && (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid)) {
            ssl_FreeSID(sid);
            sid = NULL;
        }
    if (decrypted_state != NULL) {
        SECITEM_FreeItem(decrypted_state, PR_TRUE);
        decrypted_state = NULL;
    }

    if (parsed_session_ticket != NULL) {
        if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data) {
            SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, PR_FALSE);
        }
        PORT_ZFree(parsed_session_ticket, sizeof(SessionTicket));
    }

    return rv;
}

/*
 * Read bytes.  Using this function means the SECItem structure
 * cannot be freed.  The caller is expected to call this function
 * on a shallow copy of the structure.
 */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes)
{
    if (bytes > item->len)
        return SECFailure;

    *buf = item->data;
    item->data += bytes;
    item->len -= bytes;
    return SECSuccess;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data,
                                 EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket)
{
    if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->key_name,
            SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != SECSuccess)
        return SECFailure;
    if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->iv,
            AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != SECSuccess)
        return SECFailure;
    if (ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &enc_session_ticket->encrypted_state,
            2, &data->data, &data->len) != SECSuccess)
        return SECFailure;
    if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->mac,
            TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH) != SECSuccess)
        return SECFailure;
    if (data->len != 0)  /* Make sure that we have consumed all bytes. */
        return SECFailure;

    return SECSuccess;
}

/* go through hello extensions in buffer "b".
 * For each one, find the extension handler in the table, and
 * if present, invoke that handler.
 * Servers ignore any extensions with unknown extension types.
 * Clients reject any extensions with unadvertised extension types.
 */
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length)
{
    const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handlers;

    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
        handlers = clientHelloHandlers;
    } else if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) {
        handlers = serverHelloHandlersTLS;
    } else {
        handlers = serverHelloHandlersSSL3;
    }

    while (*length) {
        const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handler;
        SECStatus rv;
        PRInt32   extension_type;
        SECItem   extension_data;

        /* Get the extension's type field */
        extension_type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length);
        if (extension_type < 0)  /* failure to decode extension_type */
            return SECFailure;   /* alert already sent */

        /* get the data for this extension, so we can pass it or skip it. */
        rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extension_data, 2, b, length);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            return rv;

        /* Check whether the server sent an extension which was not advertised
         * in the ClientHello.
         */
        if (!ss->sec.isServer &&
            !ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, extension_type))
            return SECFailure;  /* TODO: send unsupported_extension alert */

        /* Check whether an extension has been sent multiple times. */
        if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, extension_type))
            return SECFailure;

        /* find extension_type in table of Hello Extension Handlers */
        for (handler = handlers; handler->ex_type >= 0; handler++) {
            /* if found, call this handler */
            if (handler->ex_type == extension_type) {
                rv = (*handler->ex_handler)(ss, (PRUint16)extension_type,
                                                        &extension_data);
                /* Ignore this result */
                /* Treat all bad extensions as unrecognized types. */
                break;
            }
        }
    }
    return SECSuccess;
}

/* Add a callback function to the table of senders of server hello extensions.
 */
SECStatus
ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                        ssl3HelloExtensionSenderFunc cb)
{
    int i;
    ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender = &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0];

    for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) {
        if (!sender->ex_sender) {
            sender->ex_type   = ex_type;
            sender->ex_sender = cb;
            return SECSuccess;
        }
        /* detect duplicate senders */
        PORT_Assert(sender->ex_type != ex_type);
        if (sender->ex_type == ex_type) {
            /* duplicate */
            break;
        }
    }
    PORT_Assert(i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS); /* table needs to grow */
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
    return SECFailure;
}

/* call each of the extension senders and return the accumulated length */
PRInt32
ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes,
                               const ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender)
{
    PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0;
    int i;

    if (!sender) {
        sender = ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ?
                 &clientHelloSendersTLS[0] : &clientHelloSendersSSL3[0];
    }

    for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) {
        if (sender->ex_sender) {
            PRInt32 extLen = (*sender->ex_sender)(ss, append, maxBytes);
            if (extLen < 0)
                return -1;
            maxBytes        -= extLen;
            total_exten_len += extLen;
        }
    }
    return total_exten_len;
}


/* Extension format:
 * Extension number:   2 bytes
 * Extension length:   2 bytes
 * Verify Data Length: 1 byte
 * Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server)
 * Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server)
 */
static PRInt32
ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(
                        sslSocket * ss,
                        PRBool      append,
                        PRUint32    maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 len, needed;

    /* In draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send
     * both the SCSV and the empty RI, so when we send SCSV in
     * the initial handshake, we don't also send RI.
     */
    if (!ss || ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV)
        return 0;
    len = !ss->firstHsDone ? 0 :
           (ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2
                             : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes);
    needed = 5 + len;
    if (append && maxBytes >= needed) {
        SECStatus rv;
        /* extension_type */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* length of extension_data */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 1, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss,
                  ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
            TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData;
            xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] =
                                                   ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn;
        }
    }
    return needed;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                  SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;

    /* remember that we got this extension. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
    PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
    /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */
    rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type,
                                            ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn);
    return rv;
}

/* This function runs in both the client and server.  */
static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    PRUint32 len = 0;

    if (ss->firstHsDone) {
        len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes
                               : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2;
    }
    if (data->len != 1 + len  ||
        data->data[0] != len  || (len &&
        NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data,
                         data->data + 1, len))) {
        /* Can we do this here? Or, must we arrange for the caller to do it? */
        (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE);
        return SECFailure;
    }
    /* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */
    ss->peerRequestedProtection = 1;
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;
    if (ss->sec.isServer) {
        /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */
        rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type,
                                             ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn);
    }
    return rv;
}

static PRInt32
ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRUint32 ext_data_len;
    PRInt16 i;
    SECStatus rv;

    if (!ss)
        return 0;

    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
        /* Client side */

        if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount)
            return 0;  /* Not relevant */

        ext_data_len = 2 + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount + 1;

        if (append && maxBytes >= 4 + ext_data_len) {
            /* Extension type */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* Length of extension data */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ext_data_len, 2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
            rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
                                            2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount,
                                            2);
            if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
            /* The SRTP ciphers */
            for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
                rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss,
                                                ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i],
                                                2);
            }
            /* Empty MKI value */
            ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);

            ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
        }

        return 4 + ext_data_len;
    }

    /* Server side */
    if (append && maxBytes >= 9) {
        /* Extension type */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* Length of extension data */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 5, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* The selected cipher */
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1;
        /* Empty MKI value */
        ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1);
    }

    return 9;
}

static SECStatus
ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    SECItem ciphers = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
    PRUint16 i;
    unsigned int j;
    PRUint16 cipher = 0;
    PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
    SECItem litem;

    if (!ss->sec.isServer) {
        /* Client side */
        if (!data->data || !data->len) {
            /* malformed */
            return SECFailure;
        }

        /* Get the cipher list */
        rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
                                           &data->data, &data->len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return SECFailure;
        }
        /* Now check that the number of ciphers listed is 1 (len = 2) */
        if (ciphers.len != 2) {
            return SECFailure;
        }

        /* Get the selected cipher */
        cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1];

        /* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */
        for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
            if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
                found = PR_TRUE;
                break;
            }
        }

        if (!found) {
            return SECFailure;
        }

        /* Get the srtp_mki value */
        rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1,
                                           &data->data, &data->len);
        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
            return SECFailure;
        }

        /* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */
        /* XXX RFC 5764 Section 4.1.3 says:
         *   If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's
         *   response that is different than the one the client offered,
         *   then the client MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an
         *   invalid_parameter alert.
         *
         * Due to a limitation of the ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions function,
         * returning SECFailure here won't abort the handshake.  It will
         * merely cause the use_srtp extension to be not negotiated.  We
         * should fix this.  See NSS bug 753136.
         */
        if (litem.len != 0) {
            return SECFailure;
        }

        if (data->len != 0) {
            /* malformed */
            return SECFailure;
        }

        /* OK, this looks fine. */
        ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;
        ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    /* Server side */
    if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) {
        /* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP
         * preferences have been set. */
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    if (!data->data || data->len < 5) {
        /* malformed */
        return SECFailure;
    }

    /* Get the cipher list */
    rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2,
                                       &data->data, &data->len);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    /* Check that the list is even length */
    if (ciphers.len % 2) {
        return SECFailure;
    }

    /* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our
     * ciphers, if any */
    for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) {
        for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) {
            cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1];
            if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) {
                found = PR_TRUE;
                break;
            }
        }
    }

    /* Get the srtp_mki value */
    rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        return SECFailure;
    }

    if (data->len != 0) {
        return SECFailure; /* Malformed */
    }

    /* Now figure out what to do */
    if (!found) {
        /* No matching ciphers */
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    /* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */
    ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher;
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn;

    return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn,
                                                   ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn);
}

/* ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension
 * from a client.
 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data)
{
    SECStatus rv;
    SECItem algorithms;
    const unsigned char *b;
    unsigned int numAlgorithms, i;

    /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */
    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &data->data,
                                       &data->len);
    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    /* Trailing data, empty value, or odd-length value is invalid. */
    if (data->len != 0 || algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) {
        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
        return SECFailure;
    }

    numAlgorithms = algorithms.len/2;

    /* We don't care to process excessive numbers of algorithms. */
    if (numAlgorithms > 512) {
        numAlgorithms = 512;
    }

    ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash =
            PORT_NewArray(SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm, numAlgorithms);
    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) {
        return SECFailure;
    }
    ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash = 0;

    b = algorithms.data;
    for (i = 0; i < numAlgorithms; i++) {
        unsigned char tls_hash = *(b++);
        unsigned char tls_sig = *(b++);
        SECOidTag hash = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(tls_hash);

        if (hash == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
            /* We ignore formats that we don't understand. */
            continue;
        }
        /* tls_sig support will be checked later in
         * ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm. */
        ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].hashAlg = hash;
        ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].sigAlg = tls_sig;
        ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash++;
    }

    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash) {
        /* We didn't understand any of the client's requested signature
         * formats. We'll use the defaults. */
        PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash);
        ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = NULL;
    }

    return SECSuccess;
}

/* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS
 * 1.2 ClientHellos. */
static PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    static const unsigned char signatureAlgorithms[] = {
        /* This block is the contents of our signature_algorithms extension, in
         * wire format. See
         * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */
        tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa,
        tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_rsa,
        tls_hash_sha1,   tls_sig_rsa,
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
        tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa,
        tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_ecdsa,
        tls_hash_sha1,   tls_sig_ecdsa,
#endif
        tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa,
        tls_hash_sha1,   tls_sig_dsa,
    };
    PRInt32 extension_length;

    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
        return 0;
    }

    extension_length =
        2 /* extension type */ +
        2 /* extension length */ +
        2 /* supported_signature_algorithms length */ +
        sizeof(signatureAlgorithms);

    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        SECStatus rv;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signatureAlgorithms,
                                          sizeof(signatureAlgorithms), 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn;
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        PORT_Assert(0);
        return 0;
    }

    return extension_length;

loser:
    return -1;
}

unsigned int
ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(unsigned int clientHelloLength)
{
    unsigned int recordLength = 1 /* handshake message type */ +
                                3 /* handshake message length */ +
                                clientHelloLength;
    unsigned int extensionLength;

    if (recordLength < 256 || recordLength >= 512) {
        return 0;
    }

    extensionLength = 512 - recordLength;
    /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. */
    if (extensionLength < 4) {
        extensionLength = 4;
    }

    return extensionLength;
}

/* ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension possibly adds an extension which ensures that a
 * ClientHello record is either < 256 bytes or is >= 512 bytes. This ensures
 * that we don't trigger bugs in F5 products. */
PRInt32
ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int extensionLen,
                            PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    unsigned int paddingLen = extensionLen - 4;
    static unsigned char padding[256];

    if (extensionLen == 0) {
        return 0;
    }

    if (extensionLen < 4 ||
        extensionLen > maxBytes ||
        paddingLen > sizeof(padding)) {
        PORT_Assert(0);
        return -1;
    }

    if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_padding_xtn, 2))
        return -1;
    if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, paddingLen, 2))
        return -1;
    if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, padding, paddingLen))
        return -1;

    return extensionLen;
}

/* ssl3_ClientSendDraftVersionXtn sends the TLS 1.3 temporary draft
 * version extension.
 * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Remove when TLS 1.3 is published. */
static PRInt32
ssl3_ClientSendDraftVersionXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes)
{
    PRInt32 extension_length;

    if (ss->version != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
        return 0;
    }

    extension_length = 6;  /* Type + length + number */
    if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) {
        SECStatus rv;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_tls13_draft_version_xtn, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION, 2);
        if (rv != SECSuccess)
            goto loser;
        ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] =
                ssl_tls13_draft_version_xtn;
    } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) {
        PORT_Assert(0);
        return 0;
    }

    return extension_length;

loser:
    return -1;
}

/* ssl3_ServerHandleDraftVersionXtn handles the TLS 1.3 temporary draft
 * version extension.
 * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Remove when TLS 1.3 is published. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_ServerHandleDraftVersionXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type,
                                 SECItem *data)
{
    PRInt32 draft_version;

    /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.3 */
    if (ss->version != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
        return SECSuccess;
    }

    if (data->len != 2)
        goto loser;

    /* Get the draft version out of the handshake */
    draft_version = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2,
                                                &data->data, &data->len);
    if (draft_version < 0) {
        goto loser;
    }

    /*  Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
    ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type;

    /* Compare the version */
    if (draft_version != TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION) {
        SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Incompatible version of TLS 1.3 (%d), "
                     "expected %d",
                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, draft_version, TLS_1_3_DRAFT_VERSION));
        goto loser;
    }

    return SECSuccess;

loser:
    /*
     * Incompatible/broken TLS 1.3 implementation. Fall back to TLS 1.2.
     * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): It's not entirely clear it's safe to roll back
     * here. Need to double-check.
     * TODO(ekr@rtfm.com): Currently we fall back even on broken extensions.
     * because SECFailure does not cause handshake failures. See bug
     * 753136.
     */
    SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: Rolling back to TLS 1.2", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
    ss->version = SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2;

    return SECSuccess;
}

